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Abstract
The  transitional  economies  of  Eastern  Europe  (EE)  and  the  former  Soviet
Union (FSU) experienced a dramatic increase in income inequality in the 1990s.
In this paper I  investigate  the  causes  of  unprecedented  changes  in  income
distribution  using  a  unique  panel of inequality estimates for 24 transitional
countries for the period 1989-1998. The  fixed effects model is used to control for
unobservable country-specific effects that result  in  a  missing-variable  bias  in
cross-sectional  studies.  The  relationship  between  income  inequality, measured
by Gini coefficient, and per capita GDP is shown to be positive for  EE,  but
negative  for  the  FSU.  Economic  liberalization,  privatization  and
deindustrialization are found to have contributed to the rise in income inequality
in the  transitional region. Hyperinflation also makes the distribution of income
more unequal. I  do  not  find  strong  support for unemployment and the size of
government consumption affecting income distribution. While civil conflicts
increase income inequality, the extent of political rights and civil liberties is not
found to directly affect income distribution. 
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The relationship between income inequality and economic growth has 
received much attention in the economic literature. The impact of economic 
development on income inequality, however, remains ambiguous. Even if found 
to be significant in univariate regressions of income inequality on per capita GDP, 
the parameter estimate on aggregate income loses its strength and can even 
reverse sign when other explanatory factors or country-specific dummies are 
introduced (Deininger and Squire, 1998).  
However, a common trait of the previous studies linking income inequality 
and economic growth is that they concentrated primarily on what happens to 
income distribution during the process of development, that is of rising per capita 
income. In contrast, the countries of EE and the FSU witnessed a sharp 
contraction in output during the initial stage of the transition.
1 This decline has 
been accompanied by a marked increase in income inequality, though, not at a 
uniform rate across the region. In many transitional economies inequality has 
reached levels comparable to that observed in highly unequal countries of Asia 
and Latin America.  
These developments in transitional countries pose many intriguing 
questions. What is the role of economic decline (and recovery) in changing 
                                                 











income distribution? What specific factors lie behind a noticeable increase in 
income inequality over the transition? How well do the same factors explain the 
changes in inequality across different counties?  
I attempt to answer these questions in this paper using a unique panel of 
inequality estimates constructed for 24 transitional countries of EE and the FSU 
and embracing the period from 1989 to 1998. The fact that the combined 
population of these countries exceeds 400 million people makes the understanding 
of the factors driving the changes in income distribution go far beyond a purely 
research interest. Although it is often argued that policy makers should be more 
concerned about absolute poverty than income inequality, there are several 
reasons why one may (or should) care about the latter as well. At a given rate of 
economic growth, more unequal distribution of income would be associated with 
a lower rate of poverty reduction, assuming, of course, that the poor participate 
fully in sharing the gains from growth. Moreover, as suggested in many studies 
(e.g., Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Birdsall et al., 1995; Deininger and Squire, 1998; 
Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Sylwester, 2000; Easterly, 2001), an unequal income 
distribution might itself be detrimental to long-run economic growth for a variety 
of reasons.
2 The most common arguments for this are that an unequal distribution 
of income creates pressure for re-distributional policies, and hence distorts 
                                                 
2 A number of recent studies (e.g., Forbes, 2000) suggest, however, that in the short run the 











incentives for working and investing; that it leads to abuse of power by the elite 
and to sociopolitical instability and, thus, harms the investment environment; and 
finally that, in the presence of imperfect capital markets, it reduces opportunities 
for accumulating human capital (such as education and health) and physical 
assets. From a social welfare point of view, it has also been argued that both 
utilitarian and non-utilitarian views of welfare suggest that income inequality 
reduces aggregate well-being.
3 These considerations leave no doubt that inequality 
indeed matters, and in this paper I investigate which factors underlie the trends in 
inequality observed in transitional economies.  
There is a growing amount of research which attempts to explain the rise in 
income inequality during the transition. Many existing studies try to figure out the 
possible factors behind the changes in the distribution of income using either 
theoretical models of transition (Aghion and Commander, 1999; Ferreira, 1999; 
Milanovic, 1999) or a Gini decomposition analysis (by income component or 
recipient) applied to a single country or a set of countries (Garner and Terrell, 
1998; Milanovic, 1999; Yemtsov, 2001). Yet a third approach employs cross-
country regressions to examine why income inequality is different across 
countries at a given point in time (the World Bank, 2000).  
                                                 
3 Grun and Klasen (2001) applied a set of inequality-adjusted indicators of well-being to measure 
aggregate welfare in transition countries. They found that an adjustment for inequality significantly 
influences the ranking of transition countries in terms of their absolute levels of well-being and the 











This paper represents the first attempt to identify factors underlying the 
changes in income inequality over time within countries rather than to explain 
differences in inequality levels across countries. Until now a lack of compatible 
time series data with sufficient geographical coverage ruled out the possibility of 
doing this, and I undertake the task using the assembled panel of inequality 
estimates comparable over time and across countries. I use panel data estimation 
methods to control for unobservable country-specific effects that result in a 
missing-variable bias in cross-sectional studies.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II I present 
some evidence on the evolution of income inequality and economic growth during 
the transition. Section III discusses potential determinants of rising inequality in 
transitional countries with a reference to existing literature. Section IV describes 
the data used in the empirical analysis. Section V is devoted to model 
specification and description of the estimation technique. Section VI describes 
regression results. In Section VII I examine the robustness of results. Section VIII 











II. Growth and Inequality during the Transition 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the changes in income inequality 
and changes in real GDP during 1989-1998. It clearly suggests that better growth 
performers experienced much smaller increases in income inequality. 
Figure 1. The dynamics of income inequality and GDP growth in transitional 
economies, 1989-1998 
Source: Author￿s calculations using a constructed panel of inequality estimates and the Real GDP index from 
the TransMONEE2000 database, UNICEF, Florence. 
 
There is substantial variation in the regional performance, with the 
transitional economies of EE performing much better, both in terms of economic 
growth and distributional outcomes, than the FSU countries. However, there are 
significant differences within these two groups of countries as well.  
Although quite illustrative, inequality and growth dynamics presented in 
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stages within this period. For instance, given the evidence presented in Figure 1, 
one may mistakenly conclude that Poland (POL) and Slovenia (SVN) were 
growing consistently through the 1990s while other countries were declining, and 
that inequality was uniformly trending upwards during the period. Therefore, in 
Table 1 I present the evidence on the evolution of inequality and growth 
separately for economic decline and economic recovery episodes. This analysis 
gives us a better idea of the relationship between income distribution and 
economic growth. 
Table 1. The dynamics of income inequality and GDP growth in transitional 
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1  2  3 4  5 6 7 8 
I. FSU            
a) Baltic states           
Estonia 1.5  60.76(94)  75.70  -7.85 3.74 3.31  -0.65 
Latvia 2.5  51.04(95)  59.30  -8.16 2.75 1.00 1.20 
Lithuania 3.7  64.83(94)  79.53  -7.03 3.67 2.51  -0.26 
b) Western CIS           
Belarus   10.2  62.69(95)  77.75  -6.22 5.02 0.31 0.44 
Moldova    4.0  -  32.00  -8.11 -  1.95 - 
Russia 147.0  -  55.89  -4.90  - 2.58  - 
Ukraine  50.4  -  36.61  -7.04 -  0.69 - 
c) Caucasus           
Armenia 3.8  31.63(93) 41.68  -15.29  2.08  8.42  -0.40 
Azerbaijan 7.8  41.86(95)  49.40  -9.69 2.51 2.05  -0.33 
Georgia 5.4  24.60(94) 31.70  -8.64  - 2.57  - 
d) Central Asia           
Kazakhstan  15.3  -  61.20  -5.49 -  0.84 - 
Kyrgyz Rep.  4.6  50.39(95) 60.30  -5.09  - 1.97  - 











Turkmenistan 4.6  41.99(97) 43.75  -6.25  - 1.04  - 
Uzbekistan 23.6  83.36(95) 89.50  -3.18  - 0.48  - 
II. Central EE            
Czech Rep.  10.3  84.58(92)  94.90  -5.14 2.53 0.33 1.46 
Hungary 10.2  81.89(93)  95.20  -4.53 2.66 0.32 0.52 
Poland 38.7  82.21(91)  117.15 -5.22  5.47 -0.34  1.33 
Slovak Rep.  5.4  74.97(93)  99.60  -6.26 4.09 0.41 0.74 
III. South EE           
Bulgaria 8.3  63.69(97)  65.90  -4.54 -  1.27 - 
Romania
  22.6 74.99(92)  82.08  -8.34 3.30 0.63 1.37 
IV. FY           
Croatia 4.7  59.54(93)  77.70  -10.11 3.65 0.35 1.36 
Macedonia 2.0  67.99(95)  71.50  -5.34 0.79 0.60 0.41 
Slovenia 2.0  82.04(92)  103.90  -5.99 3.66 0.37 0.40 
Source: Author￿s calculations using a constructed panel of inequality estimates and the Real GDP index and 
population data from the TransMONEE2000 database, UNICEF, Florence. 
Note: ￿-￿ in Column 3 means that by the end of 1998 a country under consideration continued to decline. 
South EE also includes Albania; the former Yugoslavia (FY) also includes Yugoslavia, FR and Bosnia-
Herzegovina. These countries are not included in the table due to the lack of data. 
 
Several major observations emerge out of the data in Table 1. First, no 
single country escaped economic decline and an increase in income inequality 
(except Poland) at the start of the transition (see Columns 5 and 7, Table 1). 
Second, after the sharp economic decline in the initial period, most of the 
countries started to recover at some later stage. In general, Eastern Europe and the 
Baltic states began growing in 1992-1994, while the non-Baltic FSU countries 
started to grow later or continued to decline as of 1998 (see Column 3, Table 1).  
Third, it appears that the economic recovery in the FSU countries was 
generally associated with declining income inequality. Conversely, recovery in EE 
countries was accompanied by rising income inequality, although at very modest 











indicates that the mechanisms behind the inequality trends in EE and the FSU are 
not necessarily the same.  
In what follows I discuss potential determinants of the changes in income 
distribution in transitional countries. This discussion serves as a basis for the 
choice of variables used later in the empirical analysis. Most of the factors that I 
consider are those commonly found in the literature on the determinants of cross-
country inequality, while others are specific to the transitional region 
circumstances that I expect to be influential in explaining the pattern of income 
inequality.  
III. Potential Determinants of Rising Inequality in Transitional 
Countries 
There is a vast amount of literature on the determinants of income inequality 
that considers both the individual (e.g., increasing returns to skills) and macro 
(e.g., inflation, political democracy) level factors affecting income distribution. In 
this paper I focus on the latter, although the former might be equally important.  
The main factors that I anticipate to affect income inequality in transitional 
countries are: the level of economic development (measured by per capita GDP), 
macroeconomic conditions (inflation, unemployment), government involvement 











(economic liberalization, privatization, deindustrialization), and forces outside 
economic domain (political freedom, civil conflicts). 
Many attempts to identify a link between income inequality and the level of 
economic development have been undertaken since the seminal work of Kuznets 
(1955), who argued for an inverted U-shape relationship between income 
inequality and economic development. Although several studies (e.g., Paukert, 
1973; Ahluwalia, 1976) have found a support for such a relationship, most of the 
recent research does not find economic development to affect income distribution 
(e.g., Anand and Kanbur, 1993; Deininger and Squire, 1998; Ravallion, 1995).  
However, the striking economic decline in EE and the FSU countries in the 
initial years of the transition, and the subsequent economic recovery are expected 
to have had significant implications for income distribution. That is because 
economic decline and recovery were associated with dramatic and heterogeneous 
shocks to real incomes, the changes in the real value of social transfers, and other 
developments in social and economic conditions. Figure 1 provides strong support 
for anticipating a negative relationship between income inequality and economic 
development for transitional countries. Nevertheless, as the evidence from Table 1 
indicates, this relationship is hardly universal across countries. 
Inflation may have a strong redistributional impact through its effect on 











prices; mostly state sector employees, pensioners and beneficiaries of various 
social benefits. That would be an argument for a positive relationship between 
income inequality and inflation. However, inflation may also have an equalizing 
impact on income distribution through a progressive tax system by pushing wage 
earners into higher tax brackets, thus implying less inequality in disposable 
income. These two effects may well counterbalance each other. In a study of the 
determinants of inequality for OECD countries (Gustafsson and Johansson, 1999), 
inflation was not found to be significant in explaining inequality. That may not be 
the case for transitional economies, however, as most of them experienced a sharp 
rise in inflation at the start of the transition.
4 Moreover, the progressivity of the 
inflation tax is unlikely to be a mechanism at work in most of the transition 
countries due to a high occurrence of tax evasion. Hence, I expect inflation to be 
positively associated with income inequality in the transition region.
5 
Destruction of the old economic system and significant structural changes 
during the transition caused a substantial rise in unemployment across the region. 
In many countries the unemployment rate grew from virtually zero to 10-15 
                                                 
4 In our sample the mean annual inflation is 248 per cent, and the maximum is 9,750 per cent 
(Turkmenistan, 1993). 
5 The regressivity of the inflation tax and imperfect indexation have been found, using micro-level 
data, to increase income inequality in Brazil during the years of high inflation (Ferreira and 











percent even when measured by the number of officially registered unemployed.
6 
Unemployment is likely to largely affect those in the lower percentile of income 
distribution. Milanovic (1998) indicates that unemployment in transition countries 
increased the most amongst women, young people, and those with lower 
education. A negative impact of unemployment on income distribution has been 
confirmed in a number of studies of industrialized countries (Gustafsson and 
Palmer, 1997; Weil, 1984), and I anticipate unemployment to have an inequality-
increasing effect in transitional economies as well.  
In times of economic hardship and increasing unemployment, government-
financed projects (e.g., construction) may provide a source of employment and 
income (with low-skilled labor probably benefiting the most), which serve as a 
buffer to widening income inequality.
7 The size of the public sector is found to 
reduce inequality in cross-country studies by Stack (1978) and Boyd (1988). 
Government involvement in the economy, measured as a share of government 
consumption in GDP, decreased between 1989 and 1998 in 8 out of 15 states of 
the FSU (including the Baltic states), increased in 5 states, and was practically 
unchanged in the rest. In the EE region government consumption has declined in 
                                                 
6 The official unemployment statistics are likely to significantly understate the real level of 
unemployment. Indeed, unofficial estimates indicate significantly higher levels of unemployment. 
Moreover, many people are registered as employed even when they are not receiving payment for 
their labor. 
7 Government consumption, however, can affect the distribution of income not only on the 











only two countries, while in the remainder it has either grown or has been 
relatively stable. In this paper I look at the effect of government consumption on 
income distribution in transitional economies.
8  
Centrally planned economies were dominated to a various extent by state 
enterprises with administratively set wages. The overwhelming predominance of 
the state sector in EE and the FSU economies is widely regarded as a main reason 
for low income inequality in the region before the transition.
9 The process of 
transition brought about a massive expansion of the private sector and the share of 
the private sector employment.
10 This process is likely to increase income 
inequality due to the wage differential between the state and private sectors. 
Moreover, the distribution of earnings within the private sector is usually more 
unequal than in the state sector. That privatization can lead to rising income 
inequality is argued in theoretical models of transition by Milanovic (1999) and 
Ferreira (1999). However, due to the poor data on the scope of privatization in 
transitional countries, the impact of rising private sector on income distribution 
has not been empirically tested; until now in this paper.  
                                                 
8 Another mechanism for government to influence income distribution is through social security 
transfers. These transfers are found to reduce inequality in a cross-country study of both advanced 
and developing countries by Milanovic (1994), but appear insignificant in a study of OECD 
countries by Gustafsson and Johansson (1999). I do not analyze the impact of social transfers in 
this paper due to the lack of data.  
9 The level of income inequality in EE and the FSU before the transition was widely considered to 
be lower than in the rest of the world (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992). 
10 In many transitional countries the share of private sector in total economy has increased from 











Economic liberalization also led to profound changes in the sectoral 
composition of the economy. There is a clear trend for the industrial sector to 
shrink, while the evidence for the agricultural sector is mixed -- in some countries 
its relative importance has declined, while in others it has increased.
11 The share 
of industry in total output in the region declined on average by 25 percent from 
1989 to 1998, and in several countries the drop was even more profound. For 
instance, in the ten years after 1989 the share of the industrial sector declined from 
52% to 32% in Poland, 58% to 33% in Slovak Republic, 59% to 25% in Bulgaria, 
and 50% to 35% in Russia. It is very likely that the declining industrial sector 
employment may have an inequality-increasing impact due to an outflow of labor 
to sectors with higher wage differentials, for instance, services.
12 A negative 
relationship between industrial sector employment and income inequality is 
confirmed in studies of industrialized countries by Gustafsson and Johansson 
(1999) and Levy and Murnane (1992), and in this paper I investigate the effect of 
deindustrialization on income distribution in the transitional region.  
The process of economic transition in EE and the FSU was generally 
accompanied by the expansion of political democracy. Although a common 
                                                 
11 Diminishing relative importance of the industrial and/or agricultural sector was offset by the 
growing relative importance of services sector, which in many countries has increased 1,5 - 2 
times. 
12 Note that if the labor force moves from the remaining state-owned industrial sector to the private 












argument in the literature is that the higher degree of political democracy should 
be accompanied by a more equal distribution of income (e.g., Gradstein et al., 
2001; Rodrik, 1999), the existing evidence does not show any robust relationship 
between democracy and inequality in a cross-country regression analysis. Here I 
investigate whether political democracy affects income inequality in transitional 
countries. 
A number of countries in EE (republics of the former Yugoslavia) and the 
FSU (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan, Moldova, and Russia) 
experienced persistent internal conflicts over the last decade. Since civil conflicts 
are likely to have strong distributional consequences I analyze their impact on 
income inequality in the transitional region.  
The data used in the empirical analysis and their sources are described in 
detail in the next section.  
IV. The Data 
I construct a panel of inequality estimates using time-series data on income 
inequality across transitional countries. The majority of observations are drawn 
from the UNU/WIDER-UNDP World Income Inequality Database (WIID) 











extensive data on inequality for both developed and developing countries.
13 In 
addition, I augment these data with a few observations from Milanovic (1998) 
(mainly for 1989) and the latest household surveys conducted by the World Bank 
(2000) (mainly for 1998-1999).  
To minimize problems with data comparability across countries and over 
time I require inequality data that I select for the panel to be based on the same 
living standard indicator, have the same sample and enumeration unit, be drawn 
from nationally-representative surveys, and, whenever possible, come from one 
source.
14 Income inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient with individuals 
representing the unit of analysis. The coefficients are calculated based on 
household per capita income. The compiled panel of inequality estimates 
represents perhaps the most consistent and extensive coverage available for 
transitional countries to date. It consists of 149 observations covering 25 countries 
in transition from 1989 to 1999.
15 However,  due to either missing observations on 
other variables, or the deletion of observations based on the influence diagnostics 
tests (as discussed below), only 129 out of 149 originally assembled Gini 
coefficients are used in the estimation. A detailed description of the data on 
                                                 
13 About half of the WIID database is formed by K. Deininger and L. Squire￿s 1996 database. 
However, for the transitional region most of the data in the database come from the UNICEF/IRC 
TransMonee2000 Database, Florence. 
14 In the original WIID database most of the countries are represented with multiple time series of 
inequality estimates that often are not compatible. 











income inequality used in the empirical analysis and their sources is presented in 
Table A1 in the Appendix.  
The constructed panel of inequality estimates is far from being perfect, 
however, as not all of the above comparability requirements could always be met, 
and the resulting inequality measures are still subject to potential measurement 
error problems. The use of panel data and panel data estimation methods (to be 
discussed), however, help diminish some problems with data consistency. The 
country-specific intercepts in the fixed effects model setting can absorb, among all 
other unobservable characteristics, the differences in inequality definition across 
countries (Deininger and Squire, 1998).
16 Nevertheless, the use of panel data 
cannot remedy all data limitations, and thus the empirical results must be treated 
with some degree of caution.  
I now turn to the definitions and sources of data on explanatory variables. 
The level of economic development is measured by PPP-adjusted per capita GDP 
in constant 1992 USD. The data on PPP-adjusted per capita GDP in current USD 
come from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) 2000 database, 
and they are then deflated to 1992 prices using the U.S. GDP deflator.  
Inflation is measured as the annual percentage change in the consumer price 
index (CPI) (end-year). As CPI-based inflation is not available for all countries in 
                                                 
16 This is true, however, only if these differences are systematic. I am thankful to a referee for 











our sample for 1989 and 1990, the GDP deflator inflation is taken for those years 
instead. Finally, as neither of the mentioned above indexes could be obtained for 
Croatia (1989), Macedonia FYR (1989, 1990), and Slovenia (1989) inflation there 
is measured by the food price index (a sub-index of the CPI). All inflation data are 
drawn from the World Bank WDI 2000 database.  
Unemployment represents a share of the labor force that is without work but 
available for and seeking employment. However, as I have mentioned, 
unemployment data for transitional countries may substantially understate the 
actual scope of unemployment. Nonetheless, as no better alternative is available, 
official estimates are used in most cases. Unemployment data are taken from the 
EBRD Transition Report 2000, which provides further reference on the 
origination of the data for each country.  
General government consumption, expressed as a fraction of GDP, refers to 
all current spending for purchases of goods and services (including wages and 
salaries). It also includes most expenditures on national defense and security, but 
excludes government military expenditures that are part of government capital 
formation. As such, government consumption represents a good measure of the 
government￿s involvement in the economy. The data on government consumption 











Industrial employment represents a share of industry in total employment. I 
was able to obtain only 105 observations covering 24 countries (from the EBRD 
Transition Report 2000). As other explanatory variables contain more 
observations, the use of these employment data in the model estimation would 
substantially reduce a number of observations on other variables. Since the sample 
is relatively small, I consider that inappropriate. Therefore, I use a share of 
industry value added in GDP as a proxy for industrial sector employment.
17 This 
provides us with a substantially larger number of observations. The data come 
from the World Bank WDI 2000 database. 
Private sector employment equals the number of people employed in the 
private sector as a percentage of total employment. Data availability, however, 
represents a severe constraint here, as practically no data prior to 1993-1994 exist. 
I have managed to collect 51 observations using IMF country reports, a number 
not sufficient for our purposes. Thus, in the regression analysis I use a share of the 
private sector in GDP as a proxy for the private sector employment. Since I have 
found high correlation between the size of the private sector and the private sector 
employment in our sample (for those observations that are available), and in view 
of the lack of an alternative, such a proxy is considered to be justifiable. These 
                                                 
17 As a check of how good this proxy is I estimate the model with the industrial employment 
variable as well.  The results (discussed below) indicate that industry value added is a very good 











data and their more extensive descriptions are available in the EBRD Transition 
Report 2000. 
Economic liberalization (which is largely reflected in structural changes) is 
measured with the Cumulative Liberalization Index (De Melo et al., 1996), which 
reflects the progress with economic reforms on several fronts: internal (price) 
liberalization, external (foreign trade) liberalization, and the extent of 
privatization and banking sector reform.
18 
The progress in the introduction of political rights and civil liberties during 
the transition is measured using the Index of Political Freedom (IPF), which 
represents an arithmetic average of the political rights and civil liberties indexes 
(Freedom House, 2001). The political rights index reflects the extent to which 
people in a country can participate in the political process. The civil liberties 
index measures the freedoms to develop views, institutions, and personal 
autonomy apart from the state.  
The effect of civil conflicts on income inequality is measured using a 
dummy variable set equal to one for each year since an internal conflict has taken 
place in a given country.
19 In our sample the countries affected by civil conflicts 
are Croatia, Macedonia FYR, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan 
                                                 
18 The data are updated up to 1998. 
19 The assumption is that the effect of civil conflict (if any) on income inequality is likely to persist 












20 The historical information on civil conflicts in the region is obtained 
from the Reuters Foundation.
21  
Table A2 in the Appendix provides the descriptive statistics of the data used 
in the regression analysis. Table A3 shows the matrix of the Pearson correlation 
coefficients. 
V. Model Specification and Estimation 
The primary interest of this study is to explain the changes in income 
inequality in transitional economies, and I thus estimate income inequality as a 
function of various potential explanatory variables presented below. The base 
model specification is: 
GINI(it) = α i + β 0*GDPPC(it) + β 1*GDPPC_S(it) + β 2*INFL(it) + β 3*UNEMP(it) + 
β 4*CONSG(it) + β 6*INDVA(it) + β 7*PRIVS(it) + ε(it);  (1) 
i = 1, ￿, N; t =  1, ￿, T; 
where  i represents country index, t denotes time period, GINI is the Gini 
coefficient of income inequality, α i is a country-specific intercept, GDPPC is PPP-
adjusted GDP per capita (1992 constant USD), GDPPC_S is its squared value, 
INFL is annual inflation as measured by the year-to-year change in the consumer 
price index, UNEMP is a share of unemployed in total labor force, CONSG is 
                                                 
20 In the case of Russia I refer to the military conflict in Chechnya. 











general government consumption as a percentage of GDP, INDVA is industry 
value added as a percentage of GDP, PRIVS is the private sector share in GDP, 
and ε(it) is an error term. The assumption on ε(it) is that ε(it) ~ IID( 0,σ e
2 ). All 
variables (including the Gini coefficient) enter the regressions in the natural log 
form. The natural log of (1+INFL/100) is used for INFL variable in the 
estimations to deal with negative and very high values of INFL. The natural log of 
(1+UNEMP) is used for UNEMP variable in the estimations since the 
unemployment rate equals zero for many countries at the start of the transition. A 
squared value of GDPPC (with GDPPC expressed in the natural log form) is 
included into the regression to account for the potential quadratic relationship 
between income inequality and per capita GDP. 
In view of the large body of literature exploring the effect of income 
distribution on economic growth, one may be quick to point out the possible 
problem with the given model specification arising from the potential existence of 
a reverse causality between inequality and growth. I argue that the transition 
economies of EE and the FSU represent a unique case when the possibility of 
causality from income distribution to economic growth can be ruled out, at least 
for the period under investigation, since the reasons for the economic collapse and 
subsequent recovery in the region had clearly nothing to do with the distribution 











have tested whether income inequality Granger-causes economic growth using 
from one up to five lags, which provides us with 87 to 22 observations 
respectively. In none of the cases did the test statistic indicate that I could reject 
the null hypothesis that the Gini coefficient does not Granger-cause per capita 
GDP.
22  
I estimate equation (1) using the assembled panel for 24 transitional 
countries covering a period from 1989 to 1998. The use of panel data produces 
several well-known advantages. The most important is that it allows one to 
control for unobservable time-invariant country-specific effects that result in a 
missing-variable bias, an often-encountered problem when cross-section data are 
used. This problem is recognized in Bourguignon and Morrison (1997), Bruno et 
al. (1995), Deininger and Squire (1998), Forbes (2000), Ravallion (1995), and 
other studies.  
To control for unobservable country-specific characteristics I introduce 
country-specific intercepts in the fixed effects model setting. The addition of fixed 
effects to the model also helps alleviate potential heteroscedasticity problems 
stemming from possible differences across countries (Greene, 1997).  
There might be another reason for preferring the fixed effects model to the 
random effects model. A crucial assumption for the random effects model is that 
                                                 











country-specific terms (α i) are uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables. 
Its violation makes random effects estimates biased and inconsistent (Greene, 
1997). The use of the fixed effects model avoids this problem as individual effects 
are allowed to be correlated with other regressors. To test whether the country-
specific effects are correlated with the exogenous variables I conduct a Hausman 
test.
23 While the test statistic suggests that I cannot reject the null hypothesis for 
the base model, the results of a Hausman test are found to be sensitive to the 
model specification and sample selection. Therefore, I prefer to use the fixed 
effects model. 
More importantly, the fixed effects model is chosen since the main goal of 
this study is to investigate what factors have caused substantial changes in income 
inequality over time within countries rather than to explain variation in inequality 
across countries.
24 Thus, the use of the fixed effects estimator, which is also called 
the ￿within￿ estimator, is very appropriate since it allows one to focus on how 
changes in within-country characteristics are related to changes in within-country 
inequality. The fixed effects model is also more suitable when the focus is on a 
specific set of countries and the inference is restricted to these countries (Baltagi, 
1996, p.10). Moreover, the country-specific effects have been found to be 
                                                 
23 H 0 is that there is no correlation. The test statistic is distributed as Xk
2, where k denotes the 
dimension of the slope vector β (Baltagi, 1995, p.68). 
24 The random effects estimator combines the within and between estimators, thus giving some 












25 This implies that if the model is estimated without 
taking them into account (i.e., if a single overall intercept is included instead of 
country dummies) the estimated coefficients will be biased. 
The fixed effects estimation technique, however, is not perfect. First, 
random effects estimates are more efficient than fixed effects ones given that all 
necessary assumptions are satisfied. Second, the fixed effects model is very costly 
in terms of the lost degrees of freedom, which may represent a particular problem 
for the relatively small sample. To overcome this problem I estimate the model in 
deviations from the country means.
26 This within-countries estimator is identical 
to the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator obtained if a dummy 
variable is included for each country (as in the original formulation of equation 
(1)), but the resulting R
2 is lower (Greene, 1997, p. 619).  
Third, it has been argued (Barro, 1997, p. 37; Temple, 1999) that the fixed-
effects technique eliminates the cross-sectional information and, hence, lowers 
precision of the estimates. This problem is, of course, especially acute if most of 
                                                 
25 F-test of the null hypothesis that country-specific effects are not significant yields an F-value of 
6.14, which is higher than a critical value of 2.07. This means that I can reject the hypothesis that 
there are no country-specific effects of omitted variables. The same test was conducted for time 
effects. In this case the F9, 88 statistic was 2.10, indicating that it is not possible to reject the 
hypothesis of no time-specific effects. Hence, the use of the one-way model is appropriate. 
26 Specifying the original formulation of equation (1) as:  yit  = α i  + β ´ Xit + ε it , the formulation 
in terms of deviations from the country means becomes: ( yit -  yi ) = β ´( Xit - Xi ) + (ε it -ε i ), 











the variation in the data is due to cross-country differences. While in non-
transition countries most (approximately 90%) of the variation in inequality is due 
to variation across countries (Deininger and Squire, 1996; Li et al., 1998; Quah, 
2001), in transition countries a substantial source of the variation in inequality 
over the last decade is attributable to the profound changes in inequality over time 
(see Table A2, Appendix). Hence, the use of the fixed effects estimation for 
transitional countries seems to be appropriate. In addition, if one bears in mind 
that inequality comparisons across countries are likely to be much less reliable 
than inequality comparisons for a single country over time, despite all efforts to 
assemble the inequality estimates that are as consistent as possible both across 
space and time, the reliance on mostly over-time variation in inequality is even 
desirable.  
Given all considerations outlined above I prefer to use the fixed-effects 
model since its advantages seem to outweigh its weaknesses given the data and 
research purposes. Nevertheless, to check the robustness of the results to the 
estimation technique the random effects model is also estimated. The empirical 
results are described later in the paper. The panel that I estimate is unbalanced as a 
number of time series observations differ across countries. However, assuming 
that observations are missing randomly, consistency of the fixed effects estimator 











assumed properties of residuals, is the best linear unbiased estimator (Hsiao, 
1986). 
VI. The Regression Results 
I first estimate a ￿full￿ version of equation (1) with both the log of per capita 
GDP (GDPPC) and its squared value (GDPPC_S) included among the 
explanatory variables. This allows capturing a potential threshold effect in the 
relationship between income inequality and per capita GDP.  
It is worth noting that up to now most of the attempts to test for a U-shaped 
relationship between income inequality and economic development have used 
cross-sectional regressions. This approach may be conceptually incorrect when 
studying the intertemporal relationship between income inequality and per capita 
income. If one wants to see whether inequality changes with economic 
development longitudinal data are needed (Deininger and Squire, 1998). Here the 
use of the panel data provides an obvious advantage over purely time-series or 
cross-sectional data. 
However, to test for any kind of a quadratic relationship between income 
inequality and per capita GDP is not the main purpose of this study. Here I 
undertake an attempt to identify specific factors behind the changes in inequality 
in the transitional region. While economic growth represents a good aggregate 











processes taking place at all levels of the economy, it alone does not seem to be a 
satisfactory explanation of the inequality pattern. That is why in equation (1) I 
also introduce other potential explanatory forces into play. In addition, I estimate 
an alternative specification of equation (1) where I include only GDPPC (but not 
GDPPC_S) among the regressors to test for the linear relationship between 
income inequality and per capita GDP. Finally, since some of the explanatory 
variables in the model appear to be significantly correlated, I try several 
alternative specifications to investigate the robustness of the parameter 
estimates.
27 The regression results from estimating different modifications of 
equation (1) are reported in Table 2.
28 
                                                 
27 I note here that the test of multicollinearity for the linear model indicates that the highest 
condition index equals 4.17, which is below a cutoff point of 10 suggested in the literature. Hence, 
I do not have a problem of severe collinearity in the estimation of the model. 
28 To detect outliers and influential cases I have conducted influence diagnostics such as the 
studentized residuals, the ￿hat￿ matrix, the COVRATIO statistic, DFFITS and DFBETAS (Belsley 
et al., 1980; Bollen and Jackman, 1985). I then deleted those observations that were detected 
influential by at least 3 tests. These observations turned out to be Moldova (1990), Russia (1998), 
Tajikistan (1998), and Uzbekistan (1989). However, when the model is estimated with these 











Table 2. Fixed-effects Estimates from the Regression of the Gini Coefficient on 
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Intercept 
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Number of countries  24  24  24  24 
Number of 
observations 
129 129 129  129 
R
2 adj.  0.65  0.61  0.61  0.52 
F-value 32.66  31.97  33.33  12.14 
Estimated threshold 
level (PPP-adjusted 
GDP per capita, 1992 
USD) 
6405 - 8015  8337 
Note: All variables are in the natural log form. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. The model is 
estimated in deviations from the group means. The Yule-Walker (iterated) method was used to correct for 
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.  
*- significance at 10% level; **- significance at 5% level; ***- significance at 1% level (two-tailed tests). 
 
The regression results indicate a statistically strong relationship between 











rather than a linear relationship.
29 The parameter estimates on GDPPC and 
GDPPC_S indicate that the relationship between income inequality and economic 
growth depends on where a country stands in terms of its per capita GDP. More 
specifically, they suggest that for a country below (above) some threshold level of 
development the process of economic growth would be associated with falling 
(rising) income inequality. It is worth noting that many transition countries 
(mostly those in the FSU) had either already been below the estimated threshold 
level of per capita GDP (see Table 2) at the start of the transition, or slipped 
below this level as a result of an economic decline, and thus are expected to have 
negative relationship between growth and inequality. The linear specification 
indicates that a 10 percent decline in per capita income would increase the Gini 
coefficient at the mean by 0.48 percentage points (see Column 3, Table 2). That 
income inequality might increase during recessions was confirmed in a number of 
studies of the United States (Meier, 1973; Metcalf, 1969; Thurow, 1970). So, 
given that economic decline in many transition countries reached an 
unprecedented scale, the adverse changes in the distribution of income are not 
surprising.   
                                                 
29 I have also estimated the model with GDPPC and GDPPC_S being the only explanatory 
variables. The parameter estimates (not shown here) on both terms are statistically significant at 
1% and 5% levels respectively (negative for GDPPC and positive for GDPPC_S). The F-test 
statistics for their joint significance is 45.71 (significant at a 1% level). Adjusted R
2 for the model 











Inflation is found to increase income inequality, although the estimated 
coefficient in one of the specifications turns out to be only marginally 
significant.
30 The magnitude of the effect, however, does not appear to be large. A 
10 per cent increase in inflation would raise inequality at the mean by at most 0.08 
Gini points (see Table 2). I have also tested (using the LSDV specification) for a 
threshold effect of inflation as one would expect that it is only the inflation above 
a particular level that affects income distribution. Indeed, when I include among 
the explanatory variables in equation (1) dummies for inflation levels instead of 
INFL, a clear threshold effect is apparent. I find (see Column 2, Table 3) that 
hyperinflation (annual CPI exceeds five hundred percent) is associated with a 9.5 
percent higher income inequality compared to the situation of the relative 
macroeconomic stability (annual inflation below 20 percent). 
                                                 
30 The recent study by the World Bank (2000) has found that inflation volatility is also associated 











Table 3. Estimates from the Regression of the Gini Coefficient on Selected 












 with IPF 
(LSDV) 
Model  




1 2  3  4  5 
Intercept -  -  -  4.370*** 
(0.365) 

























































CLI -  0.034*** 
(0.011) 
-  
IPF -  -  -0.016 
(0.013) 
 
War dummy        0.125** 
(0.050) 
Number of countries  24  24  24  24 
Number of 
observations 
129 129 129  129 
R
2 adj.  0.999  0.999  0.999  0.61 
F-value 4290.35  4573.36  4194.15  15.73 
Estimated threshold 
level (PPP-adjusted 
GDP per capita, 1992 
USD) 
7255 10432 7293  - 
Note: All variables are in the natural log form. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Yule-Walker 
(iterated) method was used to correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. 
1 - excluded category is 
inflation < 20% annual. The coefficients on other categories (21-50, 51-100, 101-500) are not reported since 
they are not significant. 











Unemployment rate does not seem to have an impact on inequality in the 
base model (see Column 2, Table 2). It is very likely, however, that the parameter 
estimate on unemployment is contaminated due to a high correlation of the 
unemployment rate with other indicators of structural changes, namely 
deindustrialization and privatization (see Table A3, Appendix). Indeed, when I 
eliminate PRIVS from the estimation, the coefficient on UNEMP becomes 
positive and marginally significant (see Column 4, Table 2). Finally, when 
INDVA and INFL are also omitted from the regression, the parameter estimate on 
UNEMP becomes statistically significant at a 1% level (see Column 5, Table 2). 
The magnitude of the coefficient suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in the 
unemployment rate at the mean would raise the Gini coefficient at the mean by 
0.33 points.  
The lack of robustness of the effect of unemployment on income inequality 
may also be due to the following factors. First, a likely inequality-increasing effect 
of growing unemployment can be counterbalanced by an increasing flow of 
unemployment benefits. Second, it is also possible that the increase in between-
groups inequality stemming from larger unemployment could be offset by a more 
equal distribution of income amongst transfer recipients (Milanovic, 1999). Third, 
it has been argued that in developing countries the unemployment statistics can in 











which are generally associated with higher income inequality (Ferreira and 
Litchfield, 1998). Finally, the quality of the unemployment data can also be a 
simple and quite probable explanation of why the effect of unemployment is not 
very robust. These data, as was mentioned before, are mostly based on official 
unemployment records, which may severely underestimate not only the actual 
scope of unemployment, but also the changes in the rate of unemployment over 
time.
31 Thus, their use in the estimation may induce a substantial downward bias 
in the parameter estimate on unemployment. 
With regard to government consumption, I do not find it to influence income 
distribution. Although the sign of the parameter estimate is as anticipated, the 
coefficient on CONSG is only marginally significant in one of the specifications 
(see Table 2). The size of government consumption (as a share of GDP) may have 
poor predictive power since the total effect of this factor on income distribution 
clearly depends on the composition of government expenditures and progressivity 
of taxes used to finance them. Also, the variation in the share of GDP devoted to 
public consumption is substantially higher across countries than over time (see 
Table A2, Appendix). The estimation method that relies on the intertemporal 
variation does not capture the potential effect of government consumption on the 
levels of income inequality across countries.  
                                                 
31 Unemployment data can also be a poor indicator of labor market conditions since in many 











  The parameter estimate on INDVA supports our hypothesis that 
deindustrialization increases inequality.
32 The coefficient from the full model (see 
Column 2, Table 2) suggests that a 10 percent decline in the share of the industrial 
sector would lead to a 0.88 percentage point increase in the Gini coefficient at the 
mean. The parameter estimate implies that in Ukraine, for example, where the 
share of industrial sector in total output dropped from 48% in 1989 to 34% in 
1998, the Gini coefficient increased by 2.17 percentage points over the period due 
to this factor alone, thus explaining a third of the total increase in income 
inequality.  
There is a statistically strong positive relationship between income 
inequality and the size of the private sector. The estimated coefficient suggests 
that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of the private sector in the 
economy would result in a 0.83 point increase in the Gini coefficient. The 
magnitude of the effect does not seem to be very large. However, if one bears in 
mind that transitional countries have witnessed a substantial growth of the private 
sector, it is clear that the rising private sector employment plays a crucial role in 
explaining the increase in income inequality.  
                                                                                                                                       
and non-payment of wages rather than in the shedding of labor. 
32 I note that when the model is estimated using the available observations on the industrial sector 
employment as a share of total employment (100 observations, 23 countries), instead of those on 
INDVA, the parameter estimate is nearly identical to the one on INDVA reported in Table 6.2. 











I next look at the effect of economic liberalization on income inequality 
using the Cumulative Liberalization Index as an explanatory variable in the 
regressions. The regression results (see Column 3, Table 3) indicate that the 
process of liberalization is associated with rising income inequality.
33 The CLI is 
by construction highly correlated with the structural indicators used in our analysis 
(see Table A3, Appendix). Nevertheless, the parameter estimate on CLI is 
significant at a 1% level even when all other variables are included. The 
coefficient on PRIVS, however, becomes insignificant in this case. The parameter 
estimate on CLI indicates that a 10 percent increase in the CLI at the mean would 
be associated with a 0.27 point increase in the Gini coefficient at the mean. The 
effect of economic liberalization on income distribution is highly robust to the 
model specification.  
I next investigate the impact on the distribution of income of the factors 
outside economic domain. Transitional countries have made different progresses 
in the introduction of political rights and civil liberties during the transition, which 
makes it interesting to see whether the progress on the political freedom front has 
any implications for the distribution of income. To do this, I use the Index of 
Political Freedom (IPF) described above. It is worth noting that the IPF is highly 
correlated with some other variables (see Table A3, Appendix). For instance, it is 
                                                 
33 This finding is in contrast to that reported in the World Bank (2000), where they use the same 











positively associated with the progress in economic reforms and negatively with 
the occurrence of civil conflicts.
34 Noteworthy, the regression results do not 
indicate that the extent of political rights and civil liberties has an independent 
impact on income inequality (see Column 4, Table 3). That does not preclude, 
though, the possibility that the degree of political democracy may affect income 
inequality indirectly (Gradstein et al., 2001).  
A number of countries in the transitional region experienced the periods of 
civil conflicts and wars over the last decade. Therefore, I also look at the impact 
of civil wars on income inequality by estimating the pooled regression with a 
dummy for civil conflicts constructed as discussed above.
35 Since this dummy is 
highly correlated with the level of per capita GDP (see Table A3, Appendix), I 
omit GDPPC and GDPPC_S from the estimation. The regression results (see 
Column 5, Table 3) indicate that civil conflicts are associated with a 13.3 percent 
rise in income inequality.
36  
 
                                                                                                                                       
pooled regression rather than fixed effects). 
34 Note that the higher value of the IPF means less political rights and civil liberties. 
35 The fixed effects model cannot be estimated in this setting. Thus I perform a pooled regression. 
A pooled regression refers to an OLS regression with a single overall intercept. 
36 The civil war dummy remains significant at a 5% level even when GDPPC and GDPPC_S enter 











VII. Sensitivity Analysis 
In this section I investigate the robustness of my findings. I first check 
whether the results are sensitive to the definition of the dependent variable. 
Although most of the Gini coefficients in the data set are based on disposable 
income, there are several data points based on other welfare concepts (see Table 
A1 in the Appendix). As a first check of the robustness of the results described in 
previous section I perform the estimation using disposable income Gini 
coefficients only. Since several Gini indexes in our sample come from other 
sources than the main data series used (the WIDER database) (see Table A1 in the 
Appendix), I also examine the sensitivity of the findings to the omission of these 
observations. Finally, I estimate the model by including only those Gini 
coefficients that are based on the same welfare definition within countries.
37 The 
resulting parameter estimates are reported in Table 4.
38 
                                                 
37 Note that the estimation of the model in deviations from the country means requires that the Gini 
coefficients are as comparable as possible within countries over time but not necessarily across 
countries. For this reason the use of consumption-based Gini coefficients for Azerbaijan (see Table 
6.A1) does not cause a problem since like is compared with like. The same applies to the 
disposable monetary income Gini coefficients for Romania and Macedonia.  
38 Unfortunately, I cannot test the robustness of our findings to the use of alternative measures of 











Table 4. Fixed-effects Estimates from the Regression of the Gini Coefficient on 
Selected Explanatory Variables: Robustness to the Definition of the Dependent 








Gini coefficients only 
 
Full Model 
The WIDER database 
Gini coefficients only 
 
Full Model 
Gini coefficients based on 
the same definition within 
countries  
1 2 3  4 
Intercept 
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Number of countries  18  21  23 
Number of 
observations 
100 110  113 
R
2 adj.  0.58  0.66  0.55 
F-value 18.44  29.48  18.35 
Estimated threshold 
level (PPP-adjusted 
GDP per capita, 1992 
USD) 
5084 5758  5284 
Note: All variables are in the natural log form. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. The model is 
estimated in deviations from the group means. The Yule-Walker (iterated) method was used to correct for 
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.  
*- significance at 10% level; **- significance at 5% level; ***- significance at 1% level (two-tailed tests). 
 
Similarly to the results reported in Table 2 (quadratic specification), all 
estimations shown in Table 4 strongly support a U-shaped relationship between 











GDPPC_S are larger than their counterparts in Table 2.
39 Although the parameter 
estimates on INDVA and PRIVS differ somewhat from sample to sample (see 
Columns 2-4, Table 4), which is quite natural given the variation in the 
representation of countries and time periods across the samples, they are generally 
in line with those reported in Table 2. I note that the coefficient on inflation is 
significant in one case only (see Column 2, Table 4). In the light of our finding 
that there is a clear threshold effect in the relationship between inflation and 
inequality this result is not surprising, since the samples differ in the number of 
high-inflation observations.  
I am aware of the literature that advises to make a regression-based additive 
adjustment of the Gini coefficients based on different concepts for the purpose of 
cross-country comparisons. This approach, however, hinges on a very strong 
assumption, namely that the differences in Gini coefficients based on different 
concepts are the same across countries and over time. For transition countries, this 
assumption clearly does not hold. For instance, the comparison of the 
consumption-based Gini coefficient with the disposable income-based one 
obtained from the same survey data indicate that the former is 2 percentage points 
higher than the latter in Poland, is of the same magnitude in Russia, and is 5 
percentage points lower in Georgia (the World Bank, 2000). Thus, for these 
                                                 
39 One may not conclude here on the quality of different data series, though, as the changes in the 











countries such an adjustment can hardly be an improvement. In this situation the 
only solution is to use observations on inequality that are ￿as fully consistent as 
possible￿ (Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001).  
That is what I attempt to do in this paper. It is important to note also that 
since I use the fixed effects estimation any adjustments to the Gini coefficients 
based on the same concept within countries would be cancelled out anyway. 
Moreover, when I estimate the pooled regression by including dummies for Gini 
coefficients based on different concepts I do not find those dummies to be 
significant.
40  
I also investigate the robustness of the results to the use of the random-
effects rather than fixed-effects estimation technique. The regression results (see 
Table 5) indicate that the fixed-effects and random-effects estimates are generally 
very similar. 
                                                                                                                                       
and/or time periods.  












Table 5. Random-effects Estimates from the Regression of the Gini Coefficient on 

















































































Number of countries  24  24  24  24 
Number of 
observations 
129  129 129 129 
R
2  adj.  0.64  0.62 0.63 0.53 
Estimated threshold 
level (PPP-adjusted 
GDP per capita, 1992 
USD) 
8374 -  13422  11260 
Note: All variables are in the natural log form. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.  
*- significance at 10% level; **- significance at 5% level; ***- significance at 1% level (two-tailed tests). 
 
I next verify to what extent the results could be driven by observations for a 
particular time period. The parameter estimates are found to be fairly robust to the 
removal of any single period from the estimation.
41 I note, however, that the 
coefficient on inflation shows to be insignificant when the model is estimated 
                                                 











without data for 1993. That is not surprising since for most countries in the 
transitional region 1993 was the year of hyperinflation. Thus, the elimination of 
this year from the estimation is likely to substantially underestimate the impact of 
inflation on the distribution of income. 
As the countries in the sample differ widely in their levels of development 
and growth experiences during the transition (despite being collectively referred to 
as transitional economies), it is necessary to investigate the robustness of the 
results to the regional coverage. I first test the robustness of the results with 
respect to countries by removing one country at a time. Although the values of the 
coefficients (not reported here) fluctuate slightly, their magnitudes and 
significance levels are largely in line with those reported. 
In view of the countries￿ differences in institutional characteristics and 
macroeconomic performance during the transition, I then estimate the model 
separately for the FSU and EE regions. I do not argue that such a division of 
countries into sub-samples is perfect as countries within EE and the FSU regions 
are not homogenous, but it seems to be a natural choice in many respects. First, 
economic decline in EE was on average less profound and persistent than in the 
FSU. Second, income inequality in EE has increased much less than in the FSU. 
Third, in contrast to the FSU, most EE countries already had at least some 











transition, and were much more effective with reform implementation during the 
transition. Finally, social safety nets in EE during the transition are widely 
recognized to have been much stronger than in the FSU. The results of separate 
estimations for the FSU and EE are presented in Table 6.  
Table 6. Fixed-effects Estimates from the Regression of the Gini Coefficient on 
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Number of countries  15  9  15  9 
Number of 
observations 
65 64 65  64 
R
2  adj.  0.72 0.67 0.70  0.65 
F-value  20.83 20.11 22.88  21.99 
Estimated threshold 
level (PPP-adjusted 
GDP per capita, 1992 
USD) 
- - -  - 
Note: All variables are in the natural log form. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. The model is 
estimated in deviations from the group means. The Yule-Walker (iterated) method was used to correct for 
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.  











A number of interesting observations can be made based on them. First, 
when the estimation is performed separately for the FSU and EE countries, a U-
shaped relationship between income inequality and the level of economic 
development becomes less evident for the FSU and collapses completely for EE. 
The estimation of the re-specified model (excluding GDPPC_S to test for the 
linear relationship) indicates that inequality-development relationship is in fact 
linear within these regions. Moreover, the parameter estimate on GDPPC is 
negative for the FSU region, but positive for EE countries (see Columns 4-5, 
Table 6). These results are consistent with the found for the whole sample 
threshold effect in the relationship between income inequality and economic 
development. In fact, while the FSU countries mostly fell below the estimated 
threshold level of per capita GDP, EE countries were positioned mostly above the 
threshold. The estimated coefficients on GDPPC suggest that a 1000 USD 
increase in per capita GDP (constant 1992 prices) at the region-specific means 
would be associated with a 2.12 Gini point decrease in income inequality at the 
mean in the FSU and a 0.89 Gini point increase in income inequality at the mean 
in EE.  
A question of great interest is what makes economic growth push income 
inequality in different directions in the FSU and EE? It could be that explanation 











the levels of rent seeking and corruption in the FSU have been much higher than 
in EE. That may be one explanation of why income inequality in the former region 
has risen despite a dramatic economic decline.
42 It is also important to note that 
while the FSU countries were experiencing economic decline over most of the 
transition decade, the EE countries were growing.
43 The impact of economic 
recessions and recoveries on income distribution is not necessarily symmetric. 
Inflation is found to have a significant impact on income inequality in the 
FSU countries, but not in EE. This result clearly comes from much higher 
inflation in the former region. In contrast to the FSU countries, many of which 
experienced hyperinflation (with annual inflation measured in hundreds percent), 
most EE countries witnessed inflation rates relatively modest by transitional 
standards.  
Deindustrialization appears to be associated with rising income inequality in 
both EE and the FSU regions. This finding is robust to the alternative model 
specifications. The estimated coefficients from the linear specifications (see 
Columns 4-5, Table 6) suggest that a 10 percent decline in the share of industrial 
sector in the economy would be associated with a 1.17 and 0.54 percentage point 
                                                 
42 I do not have sufficient longitudinal data on the levels of corruption in transitional countries to 
run the fixed effects regression. However, a simple regression of the average Gini coefficient 
during the transition period on the corruption perception index (Freedom House, 2001) for 16 
transition countries of EE and the FSU indicates that higher corruption is associated with larger 
income inequality (the parameter estimate is significant at a 7% level). The regression results are 











increase in the Gini index at the region-specific means in the FSU and EE, 
respectively. 
The parameter estimates on PRIVS suggest that the growing private sector 
had an inequality-increasing effect exclusively in EE countries. This result is 
robust to the model specification. For instance, when INDVA is omitted from the 
regression, the coefficient on PRIVS becomes even more significant for EE, but 
remains insignificant for the FSU. The differential impact of privatization in two 
regions is striking given that the private sector expanded markedly in all 
economies. It is clearly a look at what makes privatization processes in EE and the 
FSU different that may provide the explanation. For instance, one consequence of 
the growing private sector in EE was a significant increase in returns to education 
and a rise in wage disparities (the World Bank, 2000). Conversely, privatization in 
the FSU countries did not substantially raise educational premiums, probably 
because of the excess supply of highly skilled labor. 
Unemployment is not found to affect income distribution. The parameter 
estimate is only marginally significant for EE in one specification (see Column 3, 
Table 6). I have also tried several other specifications of the model and the results 
(not shown here) generally suggest that the exclusion of at least one variable 
reflecting the structural change in the economy, such as PRIVS or INDVA, from 
                                                                                                                                       
43 This is reflected in the composition of our sample, where the majority of observations for the 











the linear model makes the coefficient on UNEMP significant (at a 10% level) for 
EE, but not for the FSU.  
The share of government consumption in GDP does not appear to explain 
the distributional outcomes neither in EE nor in the FSU.  
With regard to the impact of CLI and IPF on income distribution in EE and 
the FSU, the regression results suggest that economic liberalization was associated 
with rising income inequality in both regions (see Columns 2-3, Table 7).  
Table 7. Estimates from the Regression of the Gini Coefficient on Selected 
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IPF -  -  -  - 




Number of countries  15  9  15  9 
Number of 
bi













2 adj.  0.999  0.999  0.69  0.64 
F-value 2705.14  8450.25  15.71  10.57 
Estimated threshold 
level (PPP-adjusted 
GDP per capita, 1992 
USD) 
- -  -  - 
Note: All variables are in the natural log form. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Yule-Walker 
(iterated) method was used to correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. 
1 - excluded category is 
inflation < 20% annual. The coefficients on other categories (21-50, 51-100, 101-500) are not reported since 
they are not significant. 
*- significance at 10% level; **- significance at 5% level; ***- significance at 1% level (two-tailed tests). 
 
The extent of political freedom, however, does not affect income inequality 
in either region.
44 
I also look at the impact of civil conflicts on income distribution separately 
for EE and the FSU regions using the pooled regressions. The regression results 
(see Columns 4-5, Table 7) indicate that the periods of civil wars were associated 
with rising income inequality in both regions.  
Finally, it is worth noting that the results obtained from the separate 
estimations for EE and the FSU must be treated with caution due to the relatively 
small regional samples. 
                                                 
44 The results are not reported here, but available from the author upon request. I have also 
estimated several alternative specifications with IPF, but the parameter estimate on IPF is found to 












The main goal of this paper is to identify the factors that caused dramatic 
changes in income inequality in the transitional countries of EE and the FSU 
throughout the 1990s. The empirical analysis is performed using a unique panel of 
inequality estimates that cover 24 transitional countries over the period 1989-
1998. The econometric approach employs panel data estimation methods.  
I find support for a normal U-shaped relationship between income inequality 
and per capita GDP for the transitional region as a whole. It suggests that for a 
country below (above) some threshold level of development economic growth is 
associated with falling (rising) income inequality. Specifically, the relationship 
between income inequality and economic growth is shown to be negative for 
countries of EE, but positive for those of the FSU. The results suggest that 
economic recovery-promoting policies may certainly have an equalizing effect on 
income distribution in some transition countries. However, at least in the short-
run, there can be a trade-off between economic growth and income inequality in 
other countries.  
Although undoubtedly important, the relationship between income 
inequality and economic growth does not represent the main focus of this study. I 
have searched for specific economic factors and non-economic forces that 











The empirical results indicate that economic liberalization and structural 
adjustments are associated with rising income inequality. More specifically, I find 
that a 10 percent increase in the Cumulative Liberalization Index at the mean is 
associated with a 0.27 and 0.34 percentage point increase in the Gini coefficient at 
the region-specific means in the FSU and EE countries, respectively. 
Deindustrialization has a strong impact on income distribution in both regions. A 
10 percent decline in the share of industrial sector in the economy is related to a 
1.17 and 0.54 percentage point increase in the Gini coefficient at the mean in the 
FSU and EE countries, respectively. Although the economies of both EE and the 
FSU regions have been substantially privatized during the transition, the evidence 
suggests that a rapidly growing private sector has contributed to rising income 
inequality in EE countries only. A 10 percent growth in the share of private sector 
in the economy is associated with a 0.31 percentage point increase in the Gini 
coefficient at the mean in these countries.  
It is important to note that some increase in income inequality due to 
structural reforms associated with the transition from centrally-planned to market 
economy is largely inevitable and should not be considered in the negative light. 
These reforms may have sizable longer-term rewards by strengthening incentives, 
creating new jobs and fostering economic growth. Ultimately, it is better to be 











the transition of workers from the public to the private sector, and from the 
manufacturing sector to services may be of paramount importance for the 
distributional outcomes of the reforms.  
Although there is some evidence to suggest that unemployment may be 
positively associated with income inequality, the effect is not robust to model 
specification.  
The degree of government involvement in the economy through government 
consumption generally does not seem to have an impact on income distribution.  
I find that hyperinflation makes the distribution of income more unequal. 
This finding may certainly contribute to the explanation of why income inequality 
in the FSU countries (most of which experienced hyperinflation at the start of the 
transition) increased much more than in EE countries, where inflation levels have 
been relatively moderate. The important policy implication of this finding is that 
macroeconomic stabilization not only fosters economic recovery, but is also 
beneficial in terms of distributional outcomes.  
Finally, I have also investigated the role of some forces outside economic 
domain in determining income inequality in transition economies. The empirical 
evidence indicates that civil conflicts are associated with rising income inequality. 
On average, they lead to a 13.3 percent higher income inequality. The extent of 











not found to affect income distribution. Nevertheless, this index is strongly 
correlated with the indicators of structural changes in the economy, suggesting 
that political rights and civil liberties are likely to affect income distribution 
indirectly. 
To conclude, the avenue of research undertaken in this paper appears 
promising, for it reveals forces influencing income distribution in transitional 
countries. However, I certainly have not exhausted all factors explaining the 
dynamics of income inequality in the transitional region, and thus further research 











Table A1. Description of the Inequality Data Used in the Empirical Analysis  
Region/ 
Country 





















1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  12 
I. FSU                   
a) Baltic states                   
Estonia  1989  1998  9  23.00  36.97  36.97 (98)  DI, GI (90)  All/All  HH/HH pc  WIID, BM (89) 
Latvia  1989  1998  5  22.50  32.10  32.60 (97)  DI, GI (89)  All/All  HH/HH pc  WIID, BM (89) 
Lithuania 1989  1999  6  22.50
  34.00  35.04 (94)  DI, GI (89)  All/All  HH/HH pc  WIID, BM (89), 
WB (99) 
b) Western CIS                   
Belarus 1989  1999  5  22.80
  26.00  26.00 (99)  DI, GI (89)  All/All  HH/HH pc  WIID, BM (89), 
WB (99) 
Moldova  1993  1997  2  36.50  42.00  42.00 (97)  DI, GI (93)  All/All  HH/HH pc  BM (93), WB (97) 
Russia  1989  1996  5  23.80  37.83  37.83 (96)  GI   All/All  HH/HH pc  WIID, BM (89) 
Ukraine  1989  1999  6  25.80  32.00  32.00 (99)  DI, GI (97)  All/All  HH/HH pc  WIID, WB (99) 
c) Caucasus                   
Armenia  1990  1998  6  26.90  59.00  62.14 (95)  DI, GI (90)  All/All  HH/HH pc  WIID, WB (98) 
Azerbaijan  1995  1999  2  44.00  43.00  44.00 (95)  CS   All/All  HH/HH pc  WB 
Georgia  1989  1997  4  31.30  51.86  58.71 (96)  DI, GI (88,90)  All/All  HH/HH pc  WIID 
d) Central Asia                   
Kazakhstan  1990  1996  4  29.70  35.00  35.00 (96)  DI, GI (90,93)  All/All  HH/HH pc  WIID, WB (96) 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
1990  1997  3  30.80  47.00  55.30 (93)  DI, GI (90)  All/All  HH/HH pc  WIID, BM (93), 
WB (97) 
Tajikistan  1989  1990  2  31.80  33.40  33.40 (90)  GI  All/All  HH/HH pc  WIID 
Turkmenistan  1989  1993  3  31.60  35.80  35.80 (93)  DI, GI (89,90)  All/All  HH/HH pc  WIID 
Uzbekistan  1990  1994  3  31.50  33.00  33.30 (93)  DI, GI (90,94)  All/All  HH/HH pc  WIID 
II. Central EE                   
Czech Republic  1989  1997  9  19.36  27.64  28.14 (96)  DI  All/All  HH/HH pc  WIID 
Hungary  1989  1997  7  21.41  24.58  24.58 (97)  DI  All/All  HH/HH pc  WIID 
Poland  1989  1998  9  25.05  32.00  34.20 (97)  DI  All/All  HH/HH pc  WIID, WB (98) 










1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  12 
III. South EE                  
Bulgaria  1989  1997  8  24.47  34.59  34.78 (96)  DI, GI (89,91)  All/All  HH/HH pc, 
HH (89,98) 
WIID 
Romania  1989  1997  9  23.24  30.27  31.18 (95)  DI   All/All  HH/HH pc  WIID 
IV. FY                   
Croatia  1989  1998  4  25.10  33.30  33.30 (98)  DI  All/All  HH/HH pc  WIID 
Macedonia  1990  1997  5  34.90  36.65  36.94 (96)  DI   All/All  HH/HH pc  WIID 
Slovenia  1991  1998  4  22.71  25.00  25.05 (93)  DI   All/All  HH/HH pc  WIID, WB (98) 
Note: UNU/WIDER-UNDP World Income Inequality Database, Version 1.0, September 12, 2000 provides further reference on the source and estimation 
methodology for each data point drawn from this database. The data by Branko Milanovic are from the Appendix 4 ￿The Original Income Distribution 
Statistics￿ of his book Income, Inequality and Poverty during the Transition from Planned to Market Economy (1998). The data by the World Bank are taken 
from the Appendix D ￿Poverty and Inequality Tables￿ of the book Making Transition Work for Everyone: Poverty and Inequality in Europe and Central Asia 
(the World Bank, 2000).  
Disposable income (DI) is equal to gross income (GI) minus payroll and direct personal income taxes (PIT). Gross income consists of earnings from labor, 
cash social transfers, self-employment income, other income (gifts, income from property) and in-kind consumption (for instance, agricultural products grown 
on a household￿s plot of land). It is argued (Milanovic, 1998) that the difference between gross and disposable incomes is negligible for transition countries 
(especially for the pre-transition period) as gross income already excludes payroll taxes withdrawn at the source, and PIT is minimal (less than one percent of 
gross income). That allows one to use the Gini coefficients based on gross incomes as the benchmarks for the levels of income inequality observed before the 
transition (mostly for the FSU countries, for which the pre-transition disposable income Gini indexes are not available). It is very important to have these pre-
transition observations in the sample since the evidence suggests that most of the variation in income inequality over time has taken place over the initial 
period of transition and economic collapse. As the first transition-period surveys were often conducted a few years into the transition process, by taking the 
estimates of inequality derived solely from these surveys one would significantly underestimate the changes in inequality over time (which is what I want to 
explain). The Gini coefficients for Romania and Macedonia are based on disposable monetary income, which does not include in-kind consumption. These 
Gini coefficients are likely to overestimate the levels of inequality, but not the changes in inequality. Note that two data points (Azerbaijan, 1995, 1999) are 
Gini coefficients based on consumption (CS). These observations are used due to the lack of alternatives. They are not found to influence the overall results. 
The Gini index for 1988 is used in the absence of 1989 data. 
The data coming from the Family Budget Surveys (FBS) (mostly 1989 data in our sample) are not completely representative and may underestimate inequality 
as FBS excluded pensioner-headed households and households headed by the unemployed. However, the estimates of inequality obtained from transition-year 
surveys can also be downward-biased due to decreased response rates among the rich, inadequate coverage of informal sector incomes, etc. (for a detailed 
discussion of these and other data issues see Milanovic, 1998). It is not clear, though, how all these biases would, on the net, affect the changes in inequality. 
In any case, there is not much that one can do about these sorts of problems except trying to use observations that are ￿as fully consistent as possible￿ 











Table A2. Descriptive Statistics and Variance Decomposition 
Std. Dev.  Variable Mean  Min  Max 
Overall Between Within 
GINI   30.5    17.8    62.1  9.21    7.87    5.14   
GDPPC   6322.4    1649.9    13764.9  2789.40    2680.60    1191.45   
INFL  247.7    -7.6   9750.0  945.22    669.02    793.09   
UNEMP  7.9    0.0    38.8  7.39    6.84    3.89   
CONSG  18.0    6.0    27.4  4.96    4.27    2.90   
INDVA  38.2    15.3    67.4  8.71    5.30    7.02   
PRIVS  38.4    5.0    75.0  21.44    13.64    17.55   
CLI 2.6  0.0  7.7  2.11  1.21  1.81 
IPF 3.4  1.5  7.0  1.60  1.44  0.89 
Source: Author￿s calculations. 
Note: The number of observations for all variables is 129. The overall and within (over time) standard deviations are calculated over all 129 observations. The 
between (across countries) standard deviation is calculated over the means for 24 countries. 
Key: 
GDPPC = GDP per capita, PPP-adjusted USD in 1992 prices; 
INFL = Inflation rate, measured by the year-on-year change in CPI (percent); 
UNEMP = Share of unemployed in total labor force (percent); 
CONSG = Government consumption as share of GDP (percent); 
INDVA = Share of industry value added in GDP (percent); 
PRIVS = Private sector share in GDP (percent); 
CLI = Cumulative Liberalization Index (score); 










Table A3. The Matrix of the Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
 GINI  GDPPC  INFL  UNEMP  CONSG  INDVA  PRIVS  WAR_D  CLI  IPF 
GINI 1.00 
 
- - - - - - - - - 
GDPPC -0.75 
(0.00) 

































































































Note: All variables except WAR_D, CLI and IPF are in the natural log form. ln(1+INFL/100) and ln(1+UNEMP) are used for respectively INFL and UNEMP. 
WAR_D is a dummy variable equal to 1 for each year since an internal conflict has taken place in a given country. The values in parentheses indicate Prob. > | r | under 
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